IMGpapers 1976–79

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1976–79

Il. Labour & The Social Contract

Socialist Action (League for Socialist Action) Vol. 2, No. 2, 1977 · pp. 9-11 of the scan · 2,083 words

The scan: Socialist Action v2 no2 1977.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 1-2 of 2; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 9 of the scan

It is important that the return of the Wilson/ Callaghan government in 1974, on a minority basis, be understood within this general context. While remaining the sole force capable of containing the situation, its return was not an integral part of ruling class strategy but due to the grave political crisis opening up within its own ranks as a result of the miners' victory and growing nationalist pressures. A) Tory Party Crisis The 1974 election saw a significant 'shift' by layers of the Tories' middle-class base to the Liberals - who picked up a record five million votes - due to their inability to 'control' the unions. This desertion, combined with the dramatic loss of traditionally Tory votes to the SNP in Scotland, meant that the Tory Party was rapidly becoming an 'inadequate instrument! through which the ruling class could implement its polThe weakening of the Tories under the combined weight of the labour/nationalist upsurge was to precipitate an internal 'power struggle! in their ranks in which the Heath leadership was soon ousted. Its replacement by the 'ThatcherJoseph! team was clearly opposed by every major sector of big business who felt its crude market approach - reflecting its petty-bourgeois base - and its more overtly right-wing ideological stance was a liability, at that stage, to its central orientation.

The growing crisis in Tory ranks meant that the ruling class had no other option but to rely on a Labour government to 'contain' the situation while trying, in the interim, to regroup their lost support and 'hammer out' an alternative strategy in preparation for the return of a Tory government or, possibly, a government off national unity! (suitably bolstered by the Monarchy).

It is noticeable that, set - backs their strategy has received, no significant sector of the ruling class has yet seen fit to look for an alternative solution outside the framework of 'parliamentary democracy'. Liltra-right groups such as the National Front, while potentially dangerous as they pick up a fringe of disillusioned middle and working class voters, remains a negligeable force.

Their main thrust - playing on chauvinist and racist prejudices - attracts no serious sector of big business since it cuts directly across their present orientation of a) integration into the EEC; b) attempts to influence national liberation movements in the 'Third World' (e. 9. Zimbabwe) in order to protect their massive investments; and c) attempts to defuse the national pressures building up in the Linited Kingdom.

This is not to deny, of course, that the ruling class - through its successive governments - has not attempted to play on the ideological weaknesses of the labour movement to gain advantages it will increasingly use, in the coming period, divide and weaken. Passing ever more racist immigration curbs - suitably prepared by campaigns in the mass media - is a case in point. Playing on ideological weaknesses to erode democratic rights (a general tendency of capitalism in decay) is intended at this stage, however, to strengthen its traditional organisations.

While they have been largely successful in regaining much of the support lost to the Liberals in the last election - as recent by-elections tend to indicate - they have not yet resolved the differences over 'devolution! to 'incomes policy' which separate the Thatcher-Heath wings of the party and hammered out a united strategy. This can be seen most clearly from the fact that they have not yet seriously challenged the Labour government - despite its minority status - and precipitated an early general election. Almost all sections of the ruling class breathed a sigh of relief when the 'Lib-Labi pact was signed SOCIALIST ACTION

page 10 of the scan

earlier this year.

La situation is not, of course, static. It can change swiftly depending on the tempo with which a) they can unify their own ranks around a common programme; and b) the Labour government loses its ability to impose the Social Contract on a growingly restive labour movement.

B) The Labour Government While being forced to rely upon a Labour government to 'control! the present situation, ruling class are only too aware that it is unable to meet their needs. Brought to power on defeat of the Tories, it cannot attack the working class directly - to inflict severe defeats - but is forced to rely upon the 'connivancel of the trade union bureaucracy to hold its members in check. As a government resting on an apparatus which is also the leadership of the labour movement, it cannot go beyond attempts to 'contain!

This is shown most clearly by the fact that the cornerstone of the Social Contract was based on an agreement between the government and TUC which openly rejected governmental interference in union affairs and substitutedfor it a voluntary incomes policy. Wilson, within a short period of time in office, was forced to repeal the Tories Industrial Relations Act and to legally lextend' the closed shop.

The limitations imposed on the Wilson/Callaghan government by the fact that it was returned to office on the backs of powerful class mobilisations should not, of course, ¡invaluable' interim role it has been able to play for the ruling class. The Social Contract, based on the cynical collaboration of the TUC in imposing wage restraint, has allowed it to:

a) offset the worst effects of the international recession that emerged in the mid 'seventies by deepening the assault on living standards. Trading off the traditional loyalty of the unions - and threatening all opposition with the return of a 'hard-line! Tory government - Callaghan has been able to erode real wages, under Phase I and II, by over 8%; to escalate the jobless total to a post-war 'high' of 1.5 million (not including the shadow half a million women not 'officially! registered); and make slashing attacks on the social services.

b) stem the tide of labour militancy that reached major proportions against Heath by substituting for his 'confrontationist! tactics attempts to integrate the union bureaucracy into policing its own members. Such attempts have reached ever more dangerous limits as the TUC, not content with 'vetting' wage claims, has gone so far as to volunteer its own services in selling the major 'rationalisation! schemes afoot to its own members under the guise of 'industrial democracy!: e.9. the Bullock Report.

c) grant the ruling class a 'breathing spacel in which to regroup its lost support and resolve its internal crisis in preparation for the possible return of a Tory - or 'coalition' - government on the basis of the disillusion spread by Labourls own pro - capitalist policies. The large - scale abstention of Labour supporters in recent by-elections, combined with the steady drift of Scot*sh workers to the SLP or SNP, represents a -ne Labour leaders have clearly, in this sense, = ayed an indispensable role as the i.. labour 'estenants of capital!. The extent of this role Jack Jones' support for Social Contract comes under fire.

can be gauged by the fact that, ense internal weakness for the ruling class, they have been transformed into the main 'strike -breakers' against the struggles of their own members. The attitude of the TUC towards the seamens' threatened strike in late 1976 - hinting at disaffiliating them if they pursued their claim - or towards the stoppage of the Leyland :30! -men earlier this year is proof enough.

While such a role has undoubied!; deep disillusion among wide layers oi :raci: =-ally Labour supporters - and given the Tories time to resolve their internal differences -would be a serious mistake to confuse this illusion with a decisive 'set-back! or I'defeat' oi the labour movement. That would be to misjudge It is true that, compared with the response to the Heath pay code, there has been a dramatic downturn in industrial action against the effects of the Social Contract. The 14, 750, 000 days lost in strike action in 1974 had, by 1976, been whittled down to a mere 3, 000, 000. Such a down turn in industrial militancy does not so much reflect, however, an unwillingness to struggle as a serious confusion as to the political perspective of such a struggle.

The fact that the entire leadership of the labour movement, from the 'right' through to the erstwhile 'left! represented by Scanlon or Jones, has rallied to the Social Contract has seriously disoriented the rank-and-file as they have tried to grapple with the problem: how to defend living standards and job prospects without, at the same time, precipitating the 'downfall' of the Labour government and allowing the Tories back in.

The relative quiescence of the labour movement over the past decade does not, in this sense, re present a 'defeat', It represents a growing awareness that industrial militancy, by itself, cannot solve the problems of unemployment or declining living standards but must be situated within a clear political alternative to the policies of the Callaghan government. This helps explain the type of struggle that has built up over the past years which has increasingly revolved around 'broader! political issues (such as the anti-cuts demonstration in late 1976) and which has increasingly been linked with political opposit -ion in the Labour Party.

page 11 of the scan

One of the important aspects of this awareness is precisely that it has begun to find embryonic expression in the crisis opening up in the Labour Party at every level - between the NEC and the government, between sections of the PLP & the government and even, on occasions, within the cabinet itself. Such conflicts, leading on issues like 'cuts' or Iracism' to the NEC sponsoring mass action against the government's programme, are not accidental. They reflect the initial pressure of the class on 'its' party as it empirically seeks to hammer out an alternative strategy at the political level.

As frustration with the Social Contract grows in the period ahead and ever-wider layers of the class begin to challenge it - a process reflected in the mass opposition developing in the unions against Phase Ill - the crisis inthe Labour Party will be increased and accelerated. The problem of bourgeois hegemony will increasingly, in this way, be reflected in strains and tensions within the reformist apparatus as it becomes prey to contending class pressures.

If this process has not proceeded at a faster pace, the main responsibility for it lies with the lefts! - both in Parliament and the unions - who have consistently refused to mobilise the labour movement around a clear alternative to the government's pro-capitalist policies. While reacting to the pressures building up in the unions, and among other layers, figures such as Benn to the Tribunites attempt to 'integratel it into the reformist machine by blunting its biting edge, confusing and diverting it around policies which offer no serious solution to the growing crisis. C) Perspectives Ahead While the Labour government has given the Tories time to 'resolvel their internal dilemma, it has not been able - by its very nature as a government returned to power on a mass class upsurge - to qualitatively change the balance of class forces necessary for a capitalist 'solution! to Britain's deepening economic problems. The stalemate situation remains unsolved.

ANSPORT & GEXEI Day of Action march on May 25th, 1976.

The most it has been able to do is to 'contain!

the unstable situation set off by rcath's confront ationist tactics at the expense of precipitating a growing crisis within its own rai.s as everwider layers are drawn into questioning the pro-capitalist policies it has been pursuing.

The tasks the Heath government sei itself have not, in this sense, been 'resolved' despite the temporary success of the Social Contract. The period ahead will give rise to deep social instab¡lity as the ruling class finds itseli liorced' to pursue these tasks - at the expense of a labour movement increasingly challenging its traditional leadership - by the long-term trends of:

a) attacking living standards (holding down real wages, whittling away working conditions, promunemployment by 'rationalisation! schemes, and slashing the social services);

b) eroding democratic rights (introducing compulsory or 'voluntary' wage restraint, attacking the independence of the unions, opposing the democratic rights of oppressed national minorities, and eroding the gains won by women and other c) seeking to increase divisions among workers (through the use of racism or sexism, for example, to prevent a united working class 'response' to the offensive launched against them).

----- pull-quotes -----

the dynamic of the situation opened up by the re- turn of the Labour government in 1974.

← B) Ruling Class StrategyIll. The Radicalisation Process →

Something wrong on this page?