have missed the point altogether..... The United States has taken a severe setback in Southeast Asia and has gone into what I've called a zulute ornerve. If in fact we are in a condition where we won't stand up to the ideological attacks, then we're not well advised to have detente' (Newsweek, 19 January).
Thus, it is under the heading of not suffering a 'failure of nerve' that the United States has been sending arms and money to the FNLA since 1962 while voting against most of the UN resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism. Material support It appears that Nixon decided to ease off this support around 1969, probably under the joint effects of Portuguese and South African requests. Nevertheless, the material support shot up again after the overthrow of the Salazarist regime in Portugal on 25 April 1974. In January 1975 a meeting of the White House high-level intelligence coordinating body decided to send $ 300,000 to FNLA leader Holden (New York Times, 19 December). In midJuly of the same year the CIA was authorised to send $ 10 million in war material to the FNLA and UNITA. Since then, support has remained at a high level.
During the debate that broke out in Congress in December, some Senators complained about the secrecy surrounding US activities in Angola. But it was not only this formal aspect of things that was involved in the conflicts in Congress.
Different views Not all American imperialists in Africa have identical interests. Some representatives of US imperialism see their policy within the overall name wor armie conuren are reconce caeselves to the most diverse forms of political power. For them, the United States has to preserve a certain image throughout the continent, reconciling the needs of their investments in South Africa with the needs of their investments to a desire to break down the American supin the independent states.
On the other hand, other imperialist factions base their attitude on unconditional support to the southern bloc and the regime in Zaire. Even so, the American commitment in Angola is not the result of a deliberate and premeditated choice Africa. Everything indicates that the coalition of FNLAUNITA-MPLA in the Alvor accords represented a highly acceptable solution for the United States.
But subsequent events tore these accords to pieces. The confrontation between the MPLA and the FLA, had it resulted in a defeat for the latter, would have left a clear field for the political and economic projects of the MPLA, with the immediate prospect of nationalisations. South African could not accept the American Government's allowing the establishment in Angola of a regime whose first act would be to set up a state economic sector at the expense of investors. This would have been a direct threat to South African investments in the Cunene River valley and in the Cassinga mines, for example.
Serious obstacles A part trom the question of investments, an Angola controlled by the MPLA would be a serious obstacle to the South African perspective of splitting Namibia into weak separate 'Bantustans', and would have aided the forces struggling for immediate and total independence of the country. The South African state, taking advantage of its degree of independence of imperialist capital, decided on a direct intervention in Angola. While this blocked the advance of the MPLA, it forced the hand of the American Government, pushing Washington into unconditional alignment behind the FNLA and UNITA.
The reasons for the massive Soviet aid to the anti-imperialist nignters basıcaly go back port for the South African intervention.
The USSR decided to bolster its aid shipments and diplomatic activities after the South African intervention and the US aid to the FLA had threatened the diplomatic balance in black Zambia is increasingly close to the South African policy, which in itself represents a sig nificant shift in the region. An FNLA victory, which would strengthen the forces among the Bakongo ethnic group, would give a second wind to the opposition of Bakongo notables to the Ngouabi regime in the Congo. And this regime represents a not unimportant element in the Soviet position in central Africa The attempts at official dialogue between black Africa and the South African racists are becoming increasingly credible because of the concrete advantages Pretoria is dangling before the neo-colonial regimes. Finally, an FNLA victory would permit the constitution of a Zaire-Angola axis whose anti-communist weight would be quite formidable for the future of Soviet policy throughout Africa For the Soviet bureaucracy, the aim is to preserve its diplomatic clientele, among which must be placed the Congo, Somalia, Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, and now Guinea-Bissau. Nevertheless, it is out of the question to equate the Soviet intervention with the American intervention. Whatever the diplomatic reasons for the Soviet military aid to the MPLA, we must consider this aid positive and reject the hypocritical attitude of those who call for 'noninterference by the great powers. Anti-capitalist The consequences of this aid on the political course of the MPLA remain to be measured.
In any case, the MPLA needed no Soviet pressure to oppose any overly impetuous development of the mass movement. While the MPLA had waged the national liberation struggles essentially in the rural areas, after 25 April 1974 the urban centres nurtured anti-capitalist currents that emerged from the student youth, over whom the MPLA had no direct control. so as not to frontally oppose a sector of the masses that was developing a spontaneous movement during the year 1975 When the civil war began to take a different course and it became necessary to prepare for a genuine protracted war, it became that much easier for the MPLA leadership to control the neighbourhood committees and isolate the far In October the neighbourhood committee of Sao Paulo was occupied by the FAPLA (the military forces of the MPLA) and nine committee membefs were arrested, along with eleven militants of other neighbourhood committees. A wave of intimidation spread. In November these militants were released; some were deported to Portugal. The CAC were very much weakened, and the MPLA leadership was easily able to bring the structures of popular power under control Lost battle Clearly, attempting to lend these forms of self-organisation an anti-capitalist content provided an opportunity to wage a battle against the MPLA leadership. This battle was lost by the far left. The CAC developed opportunist conceptions in regard to the leadership of the MPLA, while others made mistakes in the abstract character of their propaganda. The fact that the repression against them did not bring the MPLA into contlict with the masses Is proof of the mass movement's increasing reliance on the MPLA Nevertheless, this must in no way diminish our solidarity with these militants, especially those who oriented their work towards a socialist transformation of the Angolan revolution Some of these militants, such as Salvador Catao and Jose Ingumba, members of the Revolucao Socialista group, died fighting the FNLA and UNITA in Nova Lisboa, giving sterling proof of their anti-imperialist courage. The political battle of these militants is still not over A fight must be waged around the themes of freedom of expression and the right of organisation for all anti-imperialists. democracy must be demanded for those who are fighting reaction.
tary revolt of 25-26 November. their project are now becoming clear.
The hated police of the SalazarCaetano regime, the Republican Guards, have been brought out of mothballs, re-equipped with armoured cars and heavy machine guns, and turned loose against the working B.B.C Five or six bombings a day, an increasingly trigger-happy police force, deepening divisions inside the Socialist Party, a series of workers' demonstrations and strikes - the ruling class and its parties still have far to go in restoring capitalist stability in Portugal, despite the advantage they gained after the abortive miliNevertheless, certain aspects of class. On New Year's Day they shot dead four people demonstrating outside Custoias prison near Oporto for the release of leftist political prisoners. Three weeks later they I left one shop assistant dead and ON several others injured after opening fire on a strike picket in Lisbon.
The re-arming of the police means that the authorities don't have to risk using the rank-and-file soldiers to intervene against strikes and demonstrations - which in the past often meant that the troops joined in with the workers against the authorities. They thus have a breathing space in which to attempt to restructure the army as a more effective tool of repression.
The new project for the army was outlined on 24 January by the chief-of-staff, General Ramalho Eanes. The army will be made 10,800 men (more or less replacing of an 'intervention force of Copcon) and a 'territorial force' of 16,100. security, however, features among the tasks of both forces.
being beefed up with Spinolists and other reactionaries suspended after the abortive right-wing coup of 11 March 1975. At the same time an increasing number of fascist officials associated with the Salazar-Cactano regime are being released from jail to carry on their plotting for the reimposition of an open dictatorship.
'Strong state' Thus the arrest of the left-wing Otelo de Carvalho coincided with the release of General Kaulza de Arriaga - the man who led the army in Mozambique at the time of the notorious Wiriyamu massacre, and later planned to oust Caetano Red Weekly 5 February 1976 demonstrations on strike Significant The 'maintenance of internal The top brass of the army is also hour stoppage On 14 January, 3,000 people marched through the streets of Covilha, a small industrial town near Lisbon, after a two-hour stoppage against the austerity measures. On 16 January it was the turn of the Lisbon construction workers to go The next day saw not only the massive demonstration of 40,000 in Lisbon organised by Intersindical, but also an anti-Government demonstration of 5,000 in the northern city of Oporto • a very significant achievement in an area where the right reigns supreme, particularly since the Communist Party had called for a boycott of the demonstration to avoid a provocation Then on 21 January, 40,000 Lisbon shop assistants also mounted a two- during which the police launched the attack on a strike picket mentioned above.
The shop assistants' strike was especially important in that the union is led by members of the Socialist Party. The shop assistants also decided to go on the 17 January Intersindical demonstration even while condemning it as a partisan manoeuvre by the CP, and issued the following statement:
We think it necessary that the workers, whether or not they take part in the demonstration. should solidarise in a process of struggle with the following objectives: re-opening of the negotiations ween the public and private sectors These are hardly the policies of Mario Soares! And the split inside the SP is also very obvious at the op en political level. A recent meeting of local SP leaderships openly condemned the rightward turn by the Soares leadership; one of the speakers, Socialist MP Jose Luis Nunes, warned against allowing the PPD to call into question the workers commissions and the other gains which have been won.. social democracy, cannot be applied in our country These divisions culminated in the farce of the meeting of leaders of the South European Socialist Parties: Soares took a trip to the US instead, and sent in his place one right-winger and one left-wing er. The latter, the Agriculture Minister Lopes Cardoso, went out of his way to criticise the jailing of leftists after 25 November - which is supported by Soares.
Of course much of this is simply rhetoric. But it is a dramatic reflection of the tensions which are at work amongst the base of the SP. Most importantly, it provides a real possibility for revolutionaries to engage in a united front with these sections on the most burning questions of the day SP attacked One of these is undoubtedly the need to combat the growing fascist oftensive, which has been expressed mainly so far in the spate of bomb attacks against leftist homes and offices. Here too the SP can no longer claim immunity -its offices