posed of workers, were now politically bourgeois DaELICS • a posuon lom when connunists nave never shifted. He commented: "The collapse of the International is now clearly the collapse of opportunism, which is now captive to the bourgeoisie Down with opportunism, and long live the Third International." (2)
Lenin of course noted, in the whole series of articles of 1914-17, the long quantitative development of opportunism. But he was also absolutely precise on une quoruane turning poit: having tor decades to mature in conditions of "peaceful capitalism, opportunism was so mature by 1914-15 that it proved an open ally of the bourgeoisie' (our emphasis). (3) It was of course this precise turn, the transformation of quantity into quality, which meant the turn from a faction strugele within the Party to a situation were a spit and ine formanion of a new Party was necessary.
As the resolution of the First Congress of the Communist International on the Second International put it: "At the first shot in the mass slaughter the chief parties of the Second International betrayed the working class, and each of them, on the pretext of 'defence of the fatherland", went over to the side of 'its" bourgeoisie It was at that moment that the Second International finally reached bankruptcy ana Dersace. (4) METHOD It is important to note the method which Lenin employed, however, as against the Healy school of falsification. Prior to 1914 he did not call for a Party sput on ponical grounds with ine Mensneviks, despite their advocacy of voting for Cadets, their revisions of Marxism, etc; nor did he call for a split in the Second International against Bernstein et al. He only called for a split when it was conclusively snown, i te greatest event of tne class struggle. tnat internanonal Mensnevism sided with the camp or ine counter-revo union Then, of course, Lenin drew all the conclusions The split was final and for ever. The views which had previously been consacica postions to polemicise against in a faction struggle within the Party were now views which must be excluded trom the farty But for the Healy school this is doubtless all empincism • unagine only sputting wnen an event showed a world historic betrayal. Healy, of course, would have split years before on method' - and cououess expenca me vacmale cenmist renn as well. Inal would be anomer exampie or now Heavisin renders bolshevisma more orotouna!
As if the record of Lenin's struggle were not sufficient to illustrate this question, however, we have a second great experience - Trotsky's struggle within the Communist International, and then his split from it.
Here we find that Trotsky pursued an identical method and course to Lenin. TOLsKy Terused tO split from the Communist International simply because theoretical revisionism developed - the theory of socialism in one country, the "Third Period', the idea of 'social fascism', etc. He refused to split even on such gigantic betrayals as Germany in 1923, Britain in 1926, and China in 1927. Trotsky replied to each of these events bv building and con solidating a faction, but he rejected a split of the Party until the Comintern showed that it had crossed to the camp of counter-revolution in the greatest conceivable event of the class struggle - the coming to power of Hitler through Stalinist betraval in 1933.
Healyism, of course, doubtless understands this all as some manoeuvre by Trotsky. He refused a split because the Comintern was big and it was the best way to get members. Trotsky as crude manocuvrer and realpolitiker - that is the real Healyite view of Trotsky. They reduce him to their own miscraDle sature In fact, however, Trotsky explained his position very clearly and very differently: degeneration of a revolutionary party cannot as a rule be established a priori on the basis of symptoms alone. The living verification of events is indispensable. Theoretically it was still impermissible last year (1932) to have considered as absolutely ex cluded that the Bolshevik-Leninists, basing themselves on the sharpening of the class struggle, could succeed in impelling the Comintern to take the road of actual struggle against fascism.' (5)
Furthermore. clearly flowing from this he carefully distinguished in the period prior to 1933 between ue poncy and cadersho or tne communist Parties, which he described as centrist, and the class character of the parties themselves, which remained proletarian. The Communist Party is a proletarian, anti-bourgeois party, even if erroneously led. The Social Democracy, though entirely composed of workers, is entirely a bourgeois party. (6) The question of being a faction and not IN INREM CEIST GEGEN KRIEGSGEFAHR Nazi Storm In the last issue of Red Weekly we looked at the analysis made by the Workers Socialist League of the struggles within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. We saw that the WSL has not clearly broken theoretically from the Healyite confusion of a faction struggle with a split in the party. In this issue JAMES FRANCIS looks at the conditions under which Lenin and Trotsky did advocate not merely a faction fight but an organisational split into two parties.
real analysis and principle.
*The degree of fact of the greatest events of history. he wrote in November 1931:
and 1933 VORWARTS IM KANPF FASCHISMUS, HUNGER UND FROST, FUR AR BEIT. BROT 111 11 Troopers march on the Communist Party headquarters in Berlin vention.
a Party was therefore not one of manoeuvre but of "The slogan of the reform' of the Comintern was, for us, never a hollow phrase. We counted on tions.' (12) crorm as a reauty. Devcropments rolowed the worst road. That is precisely why we are compelled to decare mar me poncy or reroris exnausted to me very end.' (7) Of course once this was done then the issue was fought through to the end. In 1924 defence of 'socialism in one country' was a trend within the Party. In 1934 it was outside the Party through the Finally, just to complete the picture, we may refute the Deutscherite view on this question, which amounts to saying that in 1933 Trotsky got carried away and took an angusunable decision to sput from the Comintern. On the contrary, Trotsky outlined quite clearly in advance that the question of Germany - the most important working class movement in the world, in the most politically important country in the world, with the largest Communist Party outside the Soviet Union - was precisely a test of the same qualitative character as 1914. Thus "One of those decisive moments in history is closely approaching, when the Comintern, after a series of big but still partial' mistakes which have VARLY ROTE BETRICBIRKE see from my last article that I characterise the div ergencies of the opposition even more sharply than nas the ma onLy *But at the same time I believe that this implacable ideological fight should go parallel with very cautious and very wise organisational tactics. You have not the slightest interest in a split even if the opposition should become, accidentally, a majority at the next con....Even as an eventual minority, you should in my opinion remain disciplined and loyal towards tne party as a wnole. (11)
Later he commented: "If someone should prop ose, for example, to expel comrade Burnham I would oppose it energetically. But at the same time I find it necessary to conduct the most strenuous ideological fight against his anti-Marxist concephe even went turner: 1 neard for example that comrade Gould a supporter of Abern] proclaimed in a membership meeting -"You wish to expel us"...... If it happens that someone of the majority launches such threats I for my part would vote for censure or severe warning. (13)
In short, far from Trotsky or Cannon 'driving people out', and splitting the organisation, Trotsky would have supported disciplinary action against anyone who advocated such a course! That is a meas ure of the gulf between Healy and Trotskyism.
The fight in 1940 is precisely one of the greatest examples of a struggle in the real tradition of Lenin's faction fights - a simultaneous and dialectically linked implacable ideological and political faction fight and a relentless struggle for the unity of the party. By its open rejection of Trotsky on this, Healyism shows once again its complete break with Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the distinction between a party and a faction.
Finally, of course, 1940 should settle the ridic ulous charge that Trotsky earlier opposed a split with the Comintern because it was "big". In 1940 the SWP had a thousand members. Trotsky's fight ag ainst a split was not for numbers but for principle. Trotsky, as Lenin, split the party on the grounds of the historical betrayal of the working class and advocacy of views which had been demonstrated by these gigantic events to represent the camp ol counter-revolution. He refused a split on other questions just as much in 1940 as in 1923, 1926 or 1927. In the tradition of Lenin his distinction between party and faction was not formalism but a historic class line.
It is through a serious study of these experlences that we can approach next week the incorrect positions taken by the comrades of the WSL on the split in the Fourth International in 1953.
(1) Lenin, Collected Works (CW), Vol 21, p 16 (2) Lenin, ibid, p38; (3) Lenin, ibid, p444; (4) Resolution of the First Congress of the Comm unist International on the Berne conference of the parties of the Second International, (5) Trotsky, It is necessary to build Communist Parties and an International anew'; (6) Trötsky, 'What Next?'; (7) Trotsky, 'It is impossible to Remain in the Same International with Stalin'; (8) Trotsky, 'Germany the Key to the International Situation'; (9) Trotsky, 'Fo a Workers United Front Against Fascism; (10) rotsKy, iLis necessary to build communis Parties and an International anew'; (11) Trotsky, In Defence of Marxism, p 11; (12) Trotsky, ibid p 122; (13) Trotsky, ibid, p 145.
Red Weekly 4 March 1976