Not so long ago Red Weekly was a supporter of FRELIMO. However, now that movement has actually won its war and is installed in government in Mozambique, Red Weekly has decided to turn on it with some venom, judging by Julius Karanja's article 'Samora's sabre-rattling' (Red Weekly, 11 March).
Karanja makes a series of assertions without producing a singie snrea or evidence to supoort them. For example, the FRELIMO Government a carelessiy described as a bureaucratic regime.
What about the struggle against bureaucratic methods of work waged by the FRELIMO leadership (including President Samora Machel) during the war against Portuguese colonialism? What about the work of mass mobilisation that was necessary for that war? What about the tireless political work done among the masses in southern Mozumbique who were not directly touched by the armed struggiel in the period leading up to full independence in June 19757 What about the setting up of grupos 1 unerally dynamising groups I all try is sential ciements of political ston and contation.
Exhortations None of this fits easily into any normal definimom of the word "bureaucratic' Are we to suppose that all of this has disappeared overnight, comrade Karanja? If you think that FRELIMO has degenerated into some sort of bureaucratic clique, then you owe us a detailed explanation of this phenomAgain, why does Karanja scoff at Samora Machel's exhortations to build air-raid shelters? Perhaps he thinks that the Rhodesian and South African air forces, faced with the prospect of intensifying guerrilla struggle, would have some scruples about raiding across the border and attacking Mozambic an villages. Fortunately, the Mozambican Government is under no such illusion.
Karanja refers to the December army mutiny, and claims that those purged were 'militants' and were protesting against appalling work conditions in the armed forces'. In fact the mutiny was sparked off by an army seminar which discussed problems in the relationship between the armed forces and me seoole. There had been a number of abuses and it was decided to tighten up discipline, e.g. soldiers were not allowed to drink alcohol while in unitorm, and they were not allowed to take their weap ons outside their barracks unless on duty. Infiltration into the army was also feared: given Mozambique's proximity to South Africa this is hardly surprising It was against these discipline and security meas ures that Karanja's supposed 'militants' mutinied. is Julius Karanja really in favour of trigger-happy drunken soldiers strolling round the streets of Maputo! Or of a relaxation in security that would allow South African agents to penetrate the army with greater ease?
Remarkable But the most remarkable piece in Karanja's article is his claim that the Mozambican closure of the border with Rhodesia is a fraud designed to put pressure on Vorster to, in turn, put pressure on lan Smith to do a deal with 'moderate' black leaders and thus stifle the Zimbabwe liberation struggle -thus the politics of southern Africa dissolves into one nuge conspiracy. At the same time Karania criticises Samora Machel for not having implemented full sanctions much earlier.
Karanja even says that Machel's policy 'serves the interests of imperialism. According to The Observer of 14 March, the immediate effect of Machel's policy has been the confiscation of 20 per cent of Rhodesia's rolling stock (worth some £23 minion) and the loss of routes for 60 per cent of her foreign trade (which because of congestion freight costs, etc. cannot simply be rerouted via South Africa). It is a little uifficult to see how this "serves the interests of imperialism. Perhaps comrade Karanja would care to enlighten us.
As Tor the eariser implementation of sanctions Karanja conveniently "forgets' that Mozambique has been independent for the grand total of eight months, and that as a legacy of colonialism Mozambique inherited an economy that was not only on the verge of bankruptcy, but had been integrated by successive Portuguese administrations into the economies of South Africa and Rhodesia. There was never any doubt that the FRELIMO Government wished to implement sanctions. However, what is desirable is not always what is possible.
Are we really to condemn the Mozambican Government because it gave itself a few months breathing space before embarking on a full-scale confrontation with the Rhodesian regime? Those montis were not wasted - they were a time of con Tinued poitical mobilisation, and of attempts to im part some sort of independence and stability to the economy. Even so, the implementaiton of sanctions will undoubtedly hurt Mozambique with, for example, a direct loss of over £20 million a year on rail and port revenue. Headaches If Karanja believes FRELIMO to be insincere in its desire to aid the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, why does it allow several thousand Zimbabwe guerrillas to operate from training camps in Western Mozambique? This must have caused severe political headaches for FRELIMO leaders over the past few months, given the acute divisions in the leadership of the Zimbabwe liberation movement.
Finally, where is comrade Karanja getting his information - such as it is - trom? Certainly he has not bothered to contact the Mozambique and Guinea Information Centre, which is well able to provide him with material direct from Mozambique. We will be only too happy to let comrade Karanja use our library, and read the Mozambican magazines which arrive regularly in the office. If he were to use such facilities, perhaps he would be able to write articles which bear some relation to the realities of southern Africa. - PAUL FAUVET and JILL SHEPPARD.
Strange bedfellows: Machel (right) with Kaunda (centre) and Nyerere last week JULIUS KARANJA replies:
FRELIMO as a whole. is not an elected one!
Guidelines work? 1c rescue beir Interests First I must clarify a fundamental confusion that runs through the letter from comrades Fauvet and Sheppard: my criticisms in the article were aimec specifically at the Machel leadership and not at All the examples quoted by the comrades as evidence of a struggle against bureaucratic methods of work, with the exception of the grupos dinamizadores, date back to the time of the struggles before taking power. This is not insignificant: the policies of the Machel leadership were not (and are not) based upon any coherent revolutionary strategy but essentially upon an empirical approach -empiricism to win the sympathy of the villages, empiricism to resolve conflicts between ethnic £20 million! groups to win a base, empiricism in their breal with negotiations with the Portuguese, empiricism to structure the guerrilla organisations, etc. Essentially, therefore, its break with reformist nationalism was on an empirical basis. This empirical approach today guides the policies of Machel.
But that a bureaucratic method exists, in spite of empirical breaks made from it on certain occasions, cannot be doubted. There is a one party state. No other political party is permitted. There is a fusion of the party and the state: "The People's Republic of Mozambique will be guided by the political line defined by FRELIMO, which is the leader of the state and society' (Article 3, FRELIMO Constitution); "The People's Assembly is the supreme organ of the state' (Article 37) - this body Again: 'Anyone who deforms our line can expect no tolerance from us... If the Government is to be really capable of making the interests of the working masses its own and never deviating from serving une reople, it is essential that it remains constantly under FRELIMO's leadership' (message Trom the President of FRELIMO on the Investiture of the Transitional Government in Mozambique). Do comrades Fauvet and Sheppard consider these as guidelines against bureaucratic methods of Again, the comrades produce not a 'shred of evidence' to show that the grupos dinamizadores do not act along similar political projections: that of implementing the 'watchwords of FRELIMO' The leaders of these grupos are in fact appointed from above, and would it not be fair to say that Machel's line against those 'who deform our line' will be implemented even in these bodies?
Thus it is not our contention to say that the FRELIMO leadership has degenerated 'overnight' into bureaucratic methods. Rather, that it has never completely broken with this method.
1 am not in favour of 'trigger-happy drunken soldiers strolling around the streets of Maputo -if indeed there are any: however, I am totally against the state having a monopoly over the means of violence and totally in favour of arming the workers and peasants of Mozambique in militias to detend their interests themselves. rather thar having them 'defended" by the state that claims to The Machel regime was quick to disarm the masses following independence, and consolidatec state power by the formation of the 'National Service of People's Security' (SNASP), whose task was to 'detect. neutralise and combat all forms of subversion ... etc' - this body is responsible directly to the president, and there is no form of appeal against its decisions. If it was against this form of bourgeois discipline that the militants (some 400 of them in the armed forced mutinied, then I solidarise with them That the Machel regime has been interested in detente and diplomacy in Zimbabwe is clear. Only since September 1975 has Machel come out in favour of the armed struggle, and this only in the sense that it provides sutticient pressure at the base to make changes at the top. Has it escaped the comrades' notice, for instance, that while Machel was involved in the detente exercises, Robert Mugabe (secretary general of ZANU) was placed under house arrest between April and September 1975? Would the comrades care to explain how such a move aids the Zimbabwe liberation struggle?
Let us examine how the sanctions will 'hurt' Mozambique. Most of the goods that pass through Mozambique to or from Rhodesia pass through Beira. Beira handles about 12 per cent of the goods handled at Maputo (calculated from UN Statistical Yearbook 1974, pp 456-457), and provides a yearly income of about E20 million. As far back as last May, however, Machel was assured by the Labour Government that he would receive aid sufficient to compensate for any losses incurred on imposing sanctions. This aid has been forthcoming. Its size -Sanctions Since Maputo handles mostly South African goods, the closure ot these ports to knodesian goods wil not exactly destroy the economy. Mozambique will also lose revenue from traffic with Zaire, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa (some of which passes through Rhodesia). However, last year's Commonwealth summit pledged to compensate for these losses - Britain and Canada paying the largest proportion. Moreover, the UN Security Council has unanimously voted to extend economic aid to Mozambique. Therefore why have sanctions not been applied before?
The question of timing, it would appear, was crucial: that every means possible should be used to bring about a peacetul transition to a nec colonial solution, and to use sufficient pressure to torce smith to capitulate or be isolated. It Is true that until recently Rhodesia used Beira for about 85 per cent of its trade; but with the compretion or the rauroad (beit Bridge) to the South Rhodesia is now able to reduce its dependence on Mozambique by re-routing this traffic.
With the impact of the victory of the Angolan masses, it has become ever more urgent for imperialism to bring about a rapid solution which can ward off the threatening conflagration; thus the pressure points are being applied, above all by British imperialism through the Wilson Government Since the latter heads the advocates of a neo colonial solution for Rhodesia, is it surprising to find this same Government applauding Machel's moves? Or do comrades Fauvet and Sheppard characterise this as a leftist binge on the part of Wilson and Callaghan?
The fact that the Zimbabwe querillas have bases in Mozambique does not mean that Machel is not in favour of a neo-colonial solution in Zimbabwe: these links were formed long ago during the time FRELIMO was engaged in guerilla warfare. They continue in spite of the wishes of the Machel leadership.
Finally, I am grateful to the comrades' offer to use the MGIC library. However, they should note that this is not the only source of information available on Mozambique. Further, thev should examine the fact that tney receive from Mozambique, and not get Jost in the eupnoria or the successtul struggle tha was led by FRELIMO.
Red Weekly 1 April 1976 _Portugal/Letters 9