by the new regime. What will be the probable evolution of domestic policy under the new regime? Classical Maoist themes such as 'contestation' and 'going against the stream' will probably be quietly dropped, to the extent that they have not already been robbed of all meaning by the Chiang Ching clique's 'dictatorship' campaign. There may also be a downplaying of the militia, which in some areas seems to have been a favourite instrument of the Shanghai group, and a strengthening of the functions of the secret police and public security forces.
One can also expect fewer political campaigns and some increase in Party 'democracy', although such a 'democratisation' will extend neither to the masses nor to the defeated leadership. Just as in April the call went up in Shanghai for the execution of Teng Hsiao-ping, so show trials and further purges of the 'radicals' are not to be excluded in the present political climate.
One should note here that the normalisation of the institutional life of the bureaucracy will pose the present leaders with many headaches. Like Mao before them, the "moderates' show no signs of having solved the problem of the succession. Apart from Hua Kuo-feng, a colourless ex-provincial bureaucrat with no independent basis of support or charismatic appeal, all the "moderate" leaders are either in or tast approaching tneir seventes. slower. This is mainly because the options open to the regime are strictly limited by the critical situation in key sectors of the economy - in particular steel, coal and agriculture. It is likely that the policies eventually adopted will include a more selective approach to education, a partial liberalisation of intellectual life, the promotion or expertise (at the expense of 'redness'), a widening of differentials, and an increased stress on the role of "material incentives'. This latter will be welcomed by significant sections of the working class, who in recent years have been more and more stridently demanding differential compensation for acquisition of special skills, overtime, seniority and so on.
Privileged But the long-term result of such a turn will undoubtedly be the narrow privileged layer of intellectuals, technical experts and labour aristocrats', thus creating at the very base of society tensions similar to those that exploded with such force at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
An even more urgent problem is posed by the millions of middle school graduates "rusticated' to the villages since Cultural Revolution. These youth, who undoubtedly see themselves as the most disavantaged section of Chinese society, will now be cagerly awaits c betterment of their fate from the new 36514 death', ten years ago. creation of a can probably be hsia- fang Soviet leaders.
This impression Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan. The regime now calls on the party to 'crush the heads of the four dogs'. Ironically, it was Yao who laun ched the hunt against every critic of Mao's ideas under the slogan 'beat the wild dog to In foreign policy, most observers now expect that normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union (but not the Soviet CP) and a more flexible diplomacy will eventually replace the present one-sidedly anti-Soviet line typically associated with down in relations. the Maoists. Immediately after the arrest of the 'radical' leaders, the Peking press adopted a shrilly anti-Soviet tone. But this explained partly as a defence against the charge of 'national capitulationism", and partly as the first step in a bargaining process with the COnCusIOn.
is strengthened by the *71 new turn in China. Relations with the US could then be expected to cool somewhat. although an increase in trade links and in loans to finance purchase of advanced technology would prevent any real breakThe favourable reaction of the Thai military leaders to the changes in Peking suggests that they expect a. shift even further to the right in China's pole towards liberation struggles in South-east Asia. But this is by no means a foregone A limited rapprochemen with the Soviet Union would give China considerably more freedom to manoeuvre Will the new Chinese regime succeed in stabilising Chinese political life on a more lasting basis? The Chinese working class, far from being cowed or defeated, enters the post-Mao era immeasurably strengthened by the socio-economic development ol China over ine last quarter century and the Chinese masses have a long history of intervening, often decisively, in the political affairs of the country. present they appear to have extended a cautious welcome to Hua and his ally L Hsien-nien, but this will rapidly change a their expectations are disappointed.
Daunting Huge and daunting problems continue to face the leadership - problems that can in reality find no solution within the contines of "socialism in one country. even in the medium LCLE we can therefore expect that as the contradictions underlying the policies of the new regime are gradually laid bare (in a world context in which the military-political pressure on China's frontiers gradually lessens and new revolutionary models are established), the mass movement which has more and more emerged in recent years as ar independent factor in the Chinese politic al scene will advance to new heights of organisation and awareness * One final point concerns the fate of the 200 Trotskyists who have been rotting in Mao's prisons ever since 1sok Now that a new leadership is attempting stabilise itself in China, the forces of the Fourth International should make a bold and sustained effort - • through pickets leaflat camnaians, resolutions and lett
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Options current rather than as a setback for the left. This week he looks at the policies likely to be followed