Syrian-Palestinian relations have evolved considerably in the course of the Lehanon civil war. The calendar of events reveals four distinct stages.
From April 1975 to the end of the year, neither the Palestinian Liberation Organisation nor the Syrian regime put themselves at the centre of the Lebanese events. In fact the Sinai accords of September 1975 brought them together in common opposition to the Egyptian settlement with Israel.
The second stage of the war, from January 1976 to June and the Syrian invasion, was marked by three important changes: the PLO, despite themselves, were being dragged into the war as the rightist Christian militia launched attack after attack on the Palestinian refugee camps; the joint Palestinian-Lebanese lell forces made signinicant gains cul minating in their assault on the presidential palace and Franjieh's flight to Junieh: and finally the Syrians, in reaction to the Palestinian-left advance, supported Franjich, blockaded supplies, and used the misnamed Palestine Liberation and Saiga (a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian organisation) as their armed instruments inside Lebanon.
The third stage of the war was decisive from the military point of view. The syrian army, in coorainanon witn tae Right-Christian militia, inflicted defeat after defeat on both the PLO and the left. By October 1976, the PLO had been thoroughly trounced, and its leadership was now ready to follow the dictates of Syrian policy.
The fourth stage of the war is still in the process of translating the results of the third into political terms. The Riyadh Arab mini-summit has resulted in Egyptian and Saudi approval of the Syrian role in Lebanon, and the PLO has conceded defeat bv no longer insisting on syrian withdrawal as the precondition for a settlement of the war.
STRANDED The PLO is withdrawing from strategic military locations in the mountains around Beirut, heading for their camps in the South. Their left allies are stranded in a hopeless military position. The Syrian army has just occupied Beirut.
The Right-Christian militia- - now with Israeli assistance — is poised to anack Palestinian positions in the South. The Christian/Svrian alliance is showing the first signs of breaking up.
This 20 month evolution of the civil war must be set against the political climate in the Middle East following the October 1973 war. and more particularly the October 1975 Sinai records. The mair feature of these accords was the elimination of Egypt as a potential military threat to Israel, in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Sinai Syria's negotiating strength was sapped by this agreement. The Israelis hardened on the question of returning any part of the Golan Heights, occupied in 1967. Syrian diplomacy veered sharply in the bargaining position vis-a-vis tne zionist state The skilfully managed steps that were taken in this regard by the Syrian regime before the civil war included: an improvement orovran reanons win American imperialism, despite sharp denunciations of Egypt and the Sinai accords; a Syrian sponsored Eastern Front policy based on close collaboration with Jordan and the PLO, including the extension of an the PLO at the October 1974 Rabat Arab Summit conference and, later on, in the period around the Sinai accords.
The object of Syrian diplomacy was to compensate in various directions for the "loss' of Egypt in September 1975.
The steady escalation of the Lebanese civil war, which had become obvious by the beginning of 1976, took the Syrians by -CLOSCI surprise as much as it did the Palestinians. The triggering mechanism of the fighting in the early stages frenzied attacks of the Christian Right.
The latter's objective has consistently been the destruction of an organised Cally CY Have CUC Agreements, which gave Arab legitimisation' to a regulated Palestinian presence on Lebanese territory. A useful analogy can be drawn between the Rightist position and that of King Hussein of Jordan in (*Black") September 1970.
SUBTLE The Syrian intervention against the PLO, however, is a far more subile and complex phenomenon. In the first stage of the war the Syrians were adjusting to a new situation, the implications of which they did not yet quite understand.
The Syrian rift with the PLO began only after the first indications of Pales tinian-left advances on the battlefield. Even then the Svrian regime did not immediately send in troops. They backed the beleaguered Franjieh. They supplies and ammunition and infiltrated PLA and Saiqa units. Only after the failure of these manoeuvres were Syrian troops sent in.
The balance of power in Lebanon was therefore a critical factor in the Syrian decision to send troops. relationship of forces to the advantage of the Palestinian-left coalition damaged long-term Syrian aims.
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was the CuesBon.
the civil war. the Syrian army.
RELATIONS
blockaded movement policy nas now A shift in the Lebanon, just as they did in Jordan.
the Palestinianleft in Lebanon would have led to a change in the balance of forces throughout the Middle East. It would have brought to an end the relative decline in of events in Lebanon. the mass movement following the September 1970 defeat. The consequences POLICY for the entire regime would have been Syrian relations with the USA and Jordan, including its settlement prospects with Israel, would have been dealt a severe blow. The internal stability of the Assad regime would have been put in Finally, the moderate proSyrian wing of the leadership of the Palestinian tesistance would have lost ground to the hard-line "Rejection Front" on its left. This was already becoming apparent by the end of the first stage of Canon.
Syrian interests therefore meant that it was necessary to roll back the left advance at all costs. The support to Franjieh, the blockades, and the invasion were simply the means towards this end. By the end of the third stage of the war, this and much more had been accomplished. The PLO 1969 Cairo Agreement. had been defeated on the battlefield by This has qualitatively transformed Syrian-Palestinian relations. There can be no going back to the September 1975 'common understanding' on the matter of opposition to the Sinai accords. Today the Syrian regime is in a position to die- between tate its policy to the Palestinian resistance The Syrian-dominated "Eastern Front"
extended to emorace Lebanon and effective Syrian control of the PLO. There are reports that as early as September 1976 the Syrians began to which extend their missile defence system into The PLO is being sent to its southern controlled. bases in Lebanon where it will act as a Syrian-controlled "buffer zone' in the coming negotiations for a Syrian settlement with the Zionist state modelled after the Sinai accords. The Syrian regime has 1333333 emerged from this war in a much stronger position to bargain with the Zionist state. It has acquired this strength from its proven ability to control the development This policy has to be strictly differen tiated from that of the Christian-Right bloc. The latter's relief at Syrian help in defeating the PLO is today being tem- pered with the knowledge that the Syrians tent intend to use the PLO for their own purposes. The Syrians do not, at this stage at least, want the destruction of any organised Palestinian presence in LebThese differences are expressed in two opposing positions on the 1969 Cairo Agreement. The recent Riyadh and Cairo Arab summits in October 1976 established not only Arab acceptance of the Syrian role in Lebanon, but also Palestinian adherence to a strict interpretation of the The Syrians have placed special emphasis on the implementation of these accords by insisting upon and facilitating the transfer of Palestinian militia units to bases in the south. The Christian-Right, with overt Israeli assistance, have tried to block this development and touch off another round of fighting. So far they have not succeeded, and the Arab/Syrian plan is gradually being implemented.
This is opening up a political divide the Christian-Right and the Syrian regime which could become more important in the near future. If the Right continues its attacks on the Palestinians in the south, an active Syrian military inter vention should not be excluded.
The prospects for Arab revolutionaries
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Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Politi- Gallon tional re etion of the 1969 Cairo
ity meeting, 7pm-both at LSE, Houghton St, WC2. Also demon-