the for marthe present time.
But if their strength lay in their past experiences it was also responsible for the weaknesses during the duration of the dispute. Isolated in hundreds of different factories they failed to take account of the changing economic climate. During the 1960s a typical strike had lasted three days, had involved a few hundred people and had been settled at local or plant level.
But from major union had to reckon with the possibility, even the likelihood, that it would need to call out hundreds of thousands of people for three weeks or more. massive rise in unemployment. In the twelve months ending in October 1971 over four hundred and fifty thousand jobs in the manufacturing industry vanished. Employment fell over five per cent in industries: metal mechanical engineering and textiles.
By 1972 1½ million fewer people WEre at work September 1966 economic climate failed to influence Manchester who only related to past experience.
experience proved that short unofficial stoppages was an acceptable strategy standards.
Viewed from their position it was not surprising that the 1972 dispute was seen as an extension of normal The only Ulatic time. being a joint factory strategy instead 'of the disputes. This therefore left unquestioned their new bargaining position in relation to a falling labour market and the consequent strengthening of the employers" resistance to new pay claims. In other words, they failed to realise the full implications of their actions.
Success in Manchester would have destroyed the effectiveness of the EEF and consequently would have challenged the bargaining. Failure to ensured that only thé trade union and employers' bureaucracie. gain from a defeat of the Manchester Dul lo implications that lay disputes requires an examination of the differing strengths employers' and tions. This then brings into question the role of the national trade union leaders, effective resistance in combating the employers' offensive.
Collectively the employers entered into the advantage, employers.
May plan tactics.
tactics 1970 onwards every to Coupled with this was the offers in several manufacture, As electrical "sectionalism . The reany on the Britain than in workers, But for maintaining living incapable of needed common cause.
difference this usual sectional problem funds. national realise this understand the full behind: the workers' organisawho failed to moblise any distinct organisation being control. tar superior to both local and national levels of the trade union movement.
During the period of the dispute (over five months) the workers' representatives only met as a collective three times, once to plan the action, , once to listen to Hugh Scanlon defend the leadership and lastly to admit defeat.
This was in marked contrast to the The Times pointed out on 1972 that: 'considerable organisation has gone into dealing with the present crisis. The local employers association which has the strong backing of the national EEF has formed into sixteen manageable groups of about twenty companies, each of which have been meeting to While the employers planned their the workers sat in their factories without any guidance or plan of how to combat this offensive. Isolated from one another they failed prevent the consistent flow of settlements on a cash only basis, which even the local trade union leaders were powerless to prevent. Without leadership national level workers felt obliged to follow normal practice, that being accepting that satisfied their own sectional interests Lane correctly points VUL, could only have been held. in check it unions had been capable of generating a programme of a sufficiently broad sweep as to make the differences betweer workers seem petty and trivial.' (The Union Makes Us Strong: Tony Lane, 1974. p. 268)
sectionalism the dominant Characteristic of engineering, an unofficial district dispute was raising the level of workers' consciousness. Mass action least identifiable The four point claim failed to realise this objective. Skilled workers failed to relate to a claim that called for uniform increases. Men on the whole objected to equal pay for women, and the thirty five hour week was seen as utopian.
Even the sit-ins proved no to the employers They realised that while workers sat in their factory they were separated from one another. Heating and lighting costs may have increased, but they were amply compensated out of national It soon became clear that only the well organised factories were taking the struggle sericusly This further enhanced management's determination to win the dispute. Defeat over the well organised factories promised a massive shift back to managerial
capitalism discipline the The message of this report was
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...the employers entered into the dispute with a distinct advantage"
MIKE SMITH was Chairperson of the Ferranti ( 1972. He was thus in a unique position to ev weaknesses of the wave of factory occupations from March till August 1972. The extract we publish below is the concludi longer study which will be published elsewhere. extremely important for the engineering struggles
•..only defence was the newsheet produced by the Socialists"