1 The let and era de eicone soers had long been predicting some move by the military. Leaders of the peasant unions were calling on the tradé unions to set up anti-fascist defence committees. But all warnings were lust words - no one had a clear strategy to prevent the army striking.
Natusch at first tried to present his coup aș a radical, populist one with a left image. But no one believed what he said. Everyone knew he had been a minister in Banzer's government. So the whole country rejected the coup. Luck The Bolivian Confederation of Workers (COB) called 1 ne only good luck that the Bolivian workers have had in recent years is that there is only one central trade union federation, so this had a big effect. Congress refused to 1CLUzISe presiacit.
At this point Natusch ran out of democratic ideas. He shut Congress down and declared martial law." COB replied with another 24-hour genera. strike and mass demonstra• these a 24-hour TAeN Natusch Al lil The On the third day the army began firing on demonstrating workers. One workers were killed in Cochabamba, whole country, involving the miners members of a traditionally right-wing union. They cut off all petrol supplies and stopped even the right-wing lorry drivers from working. No buses could run in La Paz - whenever one tried to come out onto the streets the people fighting broke out in La Paz. completely unprepared for it.
people rushing out and pounding on assaulf on the COB and miners trade union headquarters, using nelicopt- 4rv ers, machine gun emplacements and bazookas: Perhaps as many as 3-400 among the top officers over the coup. General Padilla, the commander in involved in its preparation and so Natusch -guarantees over civil liberties. On 7 November the strike ended, martial law was lifted, and Congress allowed to. meet.
But the response of the militant sections of the working class — the miners, petrol workers, bank workers. tactory demand that the COB explain why it had called the