De Valera: didn't trust Britain IN June 1940 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made an orrer to unsa r remica Eamon de Valera.
Britain, said Chamberlain, would make an immediate declaration in favour of Irish unity if de Valera's government would allow British troops and ships to have access to Irish ports in return.
The offer was made with the full knowledge and approval of the British Cabinet. It was because Britain facing military Hitler's Germany.
The Cabinet felt that occupation by Britain of Irish ports would help to check any German invasion of Britain's west coast. British intelligence, de Valera was told, was also suggesting that Germany was about to invade Ireland.
The British proposals were accompanied by a promise that a working party would be set up immediately to work out a new constitution for the 'united De Valera turned down the offer. At the time a German victory in the imminent, and perhaps Irish Premier felt that Britain was in no position to make promises.
But apparently the influential factor in de Valera's rejection was his that Britain couldn't be trusted.
Wasan assumption. When negotiating the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. the British Cabinet had offered the Irish side Commission SCLUC by border between the North and the ASSURANCE Britain had promised that the Commission would assure that the boundary between the two states would *conform closely as possible to the wishes of the population'.
It was this assurance which finally persuaded the Irish side to sign the treaty, for only two counties at the most of the six northern counties in Ireland and England.
this position, Labour Party in the North.
reflect a dangerous naivety. war seemed Unionist majority.
the But signed the Boundary Commission was delayed, and when it finally did report four vears most later it confirmed the existing six county frontier.
The British promises had been nothing understandable manoeuvre; the wishes of the population of four and a half of the six counties were ignored.
The Irish Boundary signed the 1921 treaty should have known better than to take government seriously.
After all, in 1912 the House of Commons had passed the Home Rule Bill which gave a limited independence to all of Ireland and parliament for the 32 counties. The Bill was delayed by its rejection in the House Lords, but was nevertheless due to come into force in 1914. But in 1914 Britain used the excuse of the war with Germany to delay it again. had Even without the outbreak of 'phased withdrawal RECENT calls by members of the Liberal Party for Britain to 'name a date' for the withdrawal of troops from Ireland reflect a growing wave of opinion both In Ireland the three main parties in the South hold as does the Social Democratic and But the experience of history suggests that such calls — as opposed to those for immediate withdrawal — -Now!
once the treaty was have allowed the opt more than indicated what negotiators who scale is designated.
Once the 1912, the means they could.
promised leader of the revolt, Home Rule went through 1914 were to partition Ireland. war, the signs were that an amendment to the Bill would six northeastern counties of Ireland to out of the arrangement.
The period from 1912-14 is not just an example that a British promise to withdraw from Ireland is not worth the paper it is written on: it also The happens In Ireland itself when such a time would in the Bill promising CUCK Home Rule had been passed in Ulster Loyalists the began immediate preparations to defeat the measure by any The Arms were openly imported and paraded by the Loyalists, they promised civil war, and the And, Edward Carson, even threatened appeal to Germany for help i It was such threats which by • persuading a unwilling British government Even The obvious conclusion of *Mr Mason his colonial into field declaration attacked by Terry Carlin of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, and even by Bill Rodgers of the employers' side of the dispute Petrol Retailers Association. Both agreed that Mason But the attempt to break the strike cia find some amies. int make the dispute official and it was the intervention of union official rreeman the weekend which was crucial in persuading Chamberlain: offered Irish unity declaration the period 1912-14 is that the longer une promise to witnaraw by Britain was delayed, the surer it became that the promise would never be kept. milar situation arising in a similar situation arising Westminster government were todavto make a declaration of intent' to withdraw from the North in, say, two years time Loyalists would immediately begin to re-arm. The present disunity in their camo all probability be and, happened in 1912, elements in Army would threaten mutiny.
opponents of withdrawal would have two years in which to ensure that such a withdrawal never happened.
if COCECILE anything to go by, they would probably succeed By contrast an immediate withdrawal by Britain from would leave the Loyalists in disarray.
SORt "military campaign' was launched by the Loyalists its chances of success would be minimal, for clearly it would be much more difficult to force Britain to return than it is to persuade Britain to stay.
• From a socialist point of view the demand for an immediate British withdrawal is the only political attitude which can be adopted.
Quite simply, if Britain has no right to be in Ireland 50 years from now, it has no right to be there two years, one year, or two weeks from now.
But besides this principle, the practical arguments in favour of immediate withdrawal are obvious.
OUT NOW!
Not only would all immediate withdrawal mean that the promise to quit would be fulfilled. It would also mean that in all probability the promise would be fulfilled with less violent consequences that would be entailed in any long protracted disengagement.
Three words say it all: troops out now!