IMGpapers 1976–79

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1976–79

SPAIN: (CONT.)

Socialist Action (League for Socialist Action) Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1976 · pp. 2-3 of the scan · 771 words

The scan: Socialist Action v1 no1 Jan 1976.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 3-5 of 5; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 2 of the scan

which represented a major concession to Soares.

Obstacle It has been this constant vying with each other to gain an alliance with the military which has proved the major stumbling block in Portugal to finding a socialist solution to the ongoing crisis.

From the April 1974 coup to the April 1975 Constituent Assembly elections, it was the stalinists wno denounced the Socialists for suspicious alliances with ultra-left groups!. Since the downfall of Concalves, Socialists who have criticised the CP for its 'leftist demagogy'.

Seeking an alliance with the military - or sections of it - means that both parties have consciously sought to contain the upsurge in the workers! movement within limits acceptable to the AFM which remains the major force for capitalist stability in Portugal. They have acted, a civilian facade for the mulitary wnicr has sought at every stage to oppose the workers! movement in its struggle for economic demands or the liberator movement in the colonies seeking Independence. made - such as the nationalisation of the banks in march last year - nave been wrung from it through mass More importantly still, by vying for the favour of the military, parties nave spilt ine labour moverlier" and left the AFM in the enviable position of being able to play one off against the other. a division nas deen dramatically revealed recently where the Communis Dartyle sectarian campaian against th‹ Socialists created the climate for a Icoup" whereby the military were able to intervene to roll back the gains of concessions. it has been the ¡tical arena, in this sense, as put it, Any concessions it nas of the right, basis of the workers The danger of such ernment in 1974.

monarchy. will assume an 'uncontrollable polllical shapel or whether they can defused in time by the granting or Certainly, governments throughout Europe have been unanimously urging such concessions on the Carlos regime to avoid a social explosion on the scale of Portugal. The latter is also the fear of the major opposition parties in Spain who, while putting their hats into the polare only too fearful of being overtaken by the mass movemen. Forces such as the Christian Democmats or the Junta Democratica, resenting tendencies from the Social Democrats to the monarchist supporters of Don Juan, nave all ottered their services in effecting a 'smooth path! from dictatorship to democracy.

Such forces seeking, as Le Monde La more modern, liberal regime for their country, adapted to the conditions of the Europe of the Common Market', are not alone in this course. They are supported by the Spanish Communist Party which equally sees its role as participating in what Carrillo recently called '.. a broad coalition government of national reconciliation which would include forces centre and lett on ine re-establishing freedoms...

The Spanish CP's willingness to sell itself as a reliable prop to capitalisi order is no doubt based on the role of its sister party in Portugal which participated in Spinola's coalition govThe spanisn Cr IS willing to go even further to preserve its alliance with the Liberals, however, by even contemplating support tor a Reckoning The smooth transfer to 'democracy the Communist Party and its allies note tol The new regime finds itself however, by no means likely. in a allemma. Carlos is only too discontent of a combattive working class which undoubtedly saw Franco's demise as a real opportunity lor social change. He is also aware that the worsening economic situation - as unemployment and inflation begin to bite - will add extra fuel to demands for change.

On the other hand, he is also aware that to initiate a process of 'liberalisation' would not only alienate the Iright! - the old fascists from the days of the civil war well represented in the government and army: such as General Angel Campano, to whom he has pledged support. It could also open the sluice gates to popular demands and action which could threaten to engult the regime, as happened across the border in Portugal.

Whichever way Carlos turns, , the prospects are bleak. Whatever patr he takes, he seems unlikely in the long term to stave off the day of reckoning the working class has with a regime waich, for 36 years has suppressed its most elementary rights.

It would seem unlikely, when that day arrives, that the working masses. aroused to dismantle the dictatorship, willbe trapped in the coalition government' formula of the Communist Party. Certainly, neither can satisfy their needs or aspirations.

page 3 of the scan

JANUARY 76 payt

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aware that tardiness in granting ref- orms can only further increase the

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